The remarkable facts of Lin v Par [2025] EWFC 401 mark it out as a curiosity but the judgment of Mr Justice Peel ensures this ‘highly unusual case’ is no mere novelty (para 2 of the judgment).
As particular, and peculiar, as its facts were, Peel J’s considered treatment of delay and non-disclosure as a vitiating factor have broader application. Whilst only exceptional cases will produce an outcome which provides for no orders in favour of either party and the dismissal of all claims, issues surrounding agreements and delay arise often enough in circumstances which are not uncommon at all. That is, for example, where there is a marriage that ended a long time ago and the parties made some attempt to settle their finances but failed to do so definitively.
The facts of Lin v Par are undoubtedly out of the ordinary. The Final Hearing of W’s application was heard at the end of October 2025. Decree Absolute had been pronounced in February 2002. They had separated in 2000 after a nine-year marriage. They had no children together. They had married in their twenties and were 31 (W) and 36 (H) at separation. Sat before the Court in the last months of 2025, they were 56 and 62. An agreement had been reached in October 2001 which purported to settle their finances. That agreement (found to be a Xhydias agreement) had been incorporated into a draft consent order which provided for an equal division of the matrimonial assets which, in essence, took the form of H’s companies and a clean break. At the time of the agreement, those assets were minimal although shares in one of the companies had been worth considerably more a short time earlier. Their wealth had gone from £8.5m to virtually nil (para 45). But this was, after all, many years ago. They were separating at the turn of the century as the dot-com bubble burst. They separated with what was arithmetically a 50/50 split although, it so happened, that over time the loan notes that W had retained held value whereas H’s shares declined.
In the intervening years, both parties went about their lives as if an order had been made and implemented. They had not been in touch since 2011 (4). It seems H had also given W sufficient monies in 2005 to purchase a property (137). H, for his part, was remarried with children. He had become very wealthy. Whilst W argued that the agreement had not been fully implemented and, therefore, carried reduced weight (Peel J would rule that it had been fully implemented), neither H nor W ‘had any reason to think the financial agreement had not been determinative’ (4).
Enter the third party, a Mr TP, who approached W in 2022 and whose ‘pernicious involvement’ (21) casts a strange shadow and, without whom, there would have been no proceedings. Peel J would find that Mr TP had manipulated W, becoming her friend and confidant, and causing her to believe that she had been deceived by H (5; 21). TP’s intention was to gain financial information about H. He encouraged W to seek legal advice and helped fund proceedings with this in mind. Mr TP had hoped to find out as much as possible about H’s finances through the disclosure process and cause financial harm to H and his employer. It seems that he had previously tried other means to do the same to H and he had been warned off by legal proceedings (71). His background involvement in the present proceedings had become known to H when W’s previous solicitors had accidentally copied in H and TP (70). As to TP’s identity, Peel J remarked, “He is known as a professional short trader in the financial markets, and it seems plausible that he has been attempting to destabilise the company in order to manipulate the share price for his own investing positions” (73). By trial, TP seemed to have distanced himself from the scene. The extent of H’s wealth and the limited scope of W’s application had put a stopper in the usual disclosure process. With H’s wealth in excess of £100 million (and W’s case limited to need), Peel J had accepted at a previous hearing that H’s ability to meet any award obviated the need to fulfil his Form E requirement (i.e. a “millionaire’s defence”).
W’s present-day assets were decidedly more modest. W had at the outset of proceedings had assets of approximately £100,000 but had incurred indebtedness of approximately £500,000 (largely, legal costs). Much of this was owed, in principle, to TP and another (who may have been TP himself under an alias). In fact, W’s legal costs had been paid in considerable part by H. He had funded £339,014 of W’s costs (£290,014 of which by way of a Legal Services Payment Order).
W was further found to have an earning capacity of £100,000 pa. She now sought a needs-based award of £2.63m. Her case brought on the basis that there was (i) material non-disclosure at the time of the agreement which meant it should be given no weight, (ii) the agreement was entered into under undue pressure which reduces the weight of the agreement, and (iii) the agreement was not implemented and therefore carried reduced weight. In any event, (iv) the Court had a duty to consider fairness/section 25 in conjunction with W’s needs. It was H’s case that the agreement was definitive and W’s claims should be dismissed. To pay her any more was unfair.
Peel J had no difficulty in finding that the parties had reached a Xhydias agreement in correspondence (Xhydias v Xhydias [1999] 1 FLR 683 having been decided and published in 1998) and that correspondence had set out the agreement’s essential terms and was principled and appropriate (consistent with White v White [2000] 2 FLR 981 that had been decided in October 2000).
Peel J found that there had been no undue pressure. Notably, W did not argue that undue pressure vitiated the agreement but reduced its weight. ‘Undue pressure’, per Edgar v Edgar [1981] 2 FLR 19 (at para 25), is not to be thought of in formal legal terms like estoppel but as one of the circumstances surrounding the agreement. Here, Peel J was not persuaded that W, because of ‘undue pressure’, “had no choice but to do the deal” (para 102).
As to non-disclosure, Peel J held that H had not been guilty of non-disclosure in respect of a company of H’s that was founded shortly after separation. If his behaviour did amount to non-disclosure, it was innocent and, being inadvertent, it would have been for W to show materiality. He found that if W had known about the company, she would not have done anything about it and, even if she had done so, it would have made no difference when the disclosure related to a valueless, post-separation asset (115 – 117).
Para 103 provides a useful breakdown of the principles of material non-disclosure. There are two types of non-disclosure (fraudulent and inadvertent) and the principles that apply are the same for all types of agreement ((i) – (ii)). Fraud and non-disclosure are separate grounds for set aside (citing Mostyn J in Cathcart v Owens [2021] EWFC 86; para 103 (iii)). Accordingly, the question for the Judge becomes: “Did [H] in the period leading up to the making of the [draft] order, practise a deception on [W] with the intention of gaining a personal or financial advantage for himself?” (103 (iv)). The answer to this question dictates where the burden lies when it comes to materiality. If the non-disclosure was intentionally fraudulent then it is assumed that the non-disclosure was material and the burden lies with H. If inadvertent, it is for W to prove materiality (103 (v)).
In so far as materiality is concerned, Peel J added, “In my judgment, whether non-disclosure is fraudulent or inadvertent, materiality means whether a court would likely have made the same, or a materially different order. It is not enough for the applicant to say that he/she would have considered matters afresh and might have approached the case differently. That is likely to be a necessary ingredient (if the applicant would have done nothing different, then the agreement/order would likely not have changed),but is not sufficient by itself for in the end it is the court which makes the order. Accordingly, the later court must do its best to determine whether an earlier court would have made a different order in the light of the impact of the non-disclosure. The authorities repeatedly refer to the need to show the effect of non-disclosure upon an order i.e whether a different order would have been made” (103 (vi)).
Peel J would further reject argument that the order had not been implemented and dismissed argument that the undisclosed assets had been matrimonialised. Applying Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26 (what is important is the way the asset is treated and not its title and structure), the Court ruled the relevant assets had not been matrimonialised. In any event, W was not pursuing sharing (i.e. the question of matrimonialisation did not arise).
In considering the application of section 25, Peel J offers a careful analysis of delay which is particularly useful. Where it comes to delay, Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 4 is, of course, the go-to authority. In Wyatt, the Supreme Court tidied away the confusion that had begun to accumulate. One might recall how Mostyn J had made a series of ‘obiter’ suggestions which amounted to an extra-statutory ‘limitation period’ (e.g. Rossi v Rossi [2006] EWHC 1482 (Fam)) and how, for a brief time at least, Vince stood to be the Court of Appeal authority for strike out under the FPR.[2] As such, Wyatt is the authority for the fact that there is no limitation period and, further, how lengthy delay can ‘reduce or extinguish an award’ (para 32, Wyatt).
Acknowledging that there was no limitation period, Peel J continued, “at the risk of stating the obvious, a delay of over 20 years is a highly relevant factor within the overarching analysis of fairness” (125). He quotes Lord Wilson in Wyatt who, whilst allowing W’s claim, remarked, “there is a prominent strain of public policy hostile to forensic delay. The court will look critically at explanations for it; and, even irrespective of its effect upon the respondent, will be likely, by reason of it and subject to the potency of other factors, to reduce or even to eliminate its provision for the applicant” (para 31 of Wyatt). And the effect on the respondent is relevant to consideration of the impact of delay. Peel J cites Wood J in Chambers v Chambers [1980] 1 FLR 10 who said, “the longer the lapse of time the more secure should he or she feel in the re-arrangement of financial affairs”. Crucially, we are reminded that delay is a separate issue from the fact of an agreement. In Wyatt, there had been no agreement. Here, there was the fact of the agreement and, separately, delay (Peel J refers also to A v B (Financial Remedies) (No 2) [2018]: only an informal agreement had been reached in that case).
Delay may be a separate factor but it does not exist in isolation. Most significantly, it has a direct impact on needs. In Wyatt, W had presented her case below on the premise of need. By Lord Wilson’s reasoning, her entitlement lay, however, not with uncaused needs but post-relationship contributions. Unlike in Wyatt, no contributions argument was available to W here. As Peel J emphasised (citing Lord Wilson at para 33 of Wyatt), “there is clear authority to the effect that needs should ordinarily be met by the payer only if there is a clear causal link between those needs and the relationship. The mere fact that the payer has great wealth is insufficient to justify a needs award” (129).
It seems, therefore, that where it comes to delay, causality seems to be essential. Lord Wilson said as much in Wyatt and that makes it hard to argue. This is so even when a causal link between needs and the relationship, in the ordinary course of things, is plainly not always required. Ordinarily, the needs of the, for example, ill ex-spouse are not circumscribed by causation but the spouse taken as they are. Usually, ‘need’ is not used as the shortened form of ‘relationship-generated need’.
In summary, Peel J found that the parties had freely entered into an agreement that they understood, was implemented, was fair and the sort of order a Court would have made (132). There was no good reason not to hold the parties to it. This was ‘all the more so’ because of the passage of time (133). It is, ‘inherently unfair on H to be subject to a claim twenty years after a full and final settlement was entered into, which both parties intended and believed was binding. He and W set about their separate lives on that critical assumption. Had a court order been made, W would have no claims. H was entitled to think that he was free of any further financial claims. Why should the outcome be different just because the draft order was, for some unknown reason, not lodged and made a court order?’ (133)
H could not be responsible for W’s life choices and could not be her insurer of ‘last resort’ (134 – 135; Thorpe LJ in North v North [2008] 1 FLR 158 spoke of H as ‘an insurer against all hazards’, at para 32). H’s wealth was entirely post-separation (138). The litigation had cost H £1.75 million in his own (and W’s) legal fees (139). If W was to be given an award there was reason to think Mr TP could be the beneficiary. That W had no provision for retirement did not make it for H to fund it (140 – 143). There was no obvious causal link between her needs now and the relationship which ended in 2000 (144). A disparity in wealth now does not justify an award. Accordingly, no orders were made in respect of either party and all claims dismissed with an immediate clean break.
The case’s unusual facts and the dramatic outcome can hardly be separated out but the judgment’s careful consideration of delay and material non-disclosure clearly has wider application.
[1] Peel J collects together the various principles from the Supreme Court (Sharland v Sharland [2015] UKSC 60 and Gohil v Gohil [2015] UKSC 61) and the Court of Appeal’s decision in Helliwell v Entwistle [2025] EWCA Civ 1055. The Court of Appeal is where Entwistle is destined to remain. The SC refused permission to appeal on 19 November 2025.
[2] Appearing for Ms. Wyatt in the original proceedings in the High Court, the former looked like they might present a formidable if not insurmountable obstacle.
