Enforcement order applications are governed by section 11J of the Children Act 1989.
Section 11J sets out:
1) This section applies if a child arrangements order with respect to a child has been made.
(2) If the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a person has failed to comply with a provision of the child arrangements order, it may make an order (an “enforcement order”) imposing on the person an unpaid work requirement.
(3) But the court may not make an enforcement order if it is satisfied that the person had a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the provision;
(4) The burden of proof as to the matter mentioned in subsection (3) lies on the person claiming to have had a reasonable excuse, and the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.
(5) The court may make an enforcement order in relation to the child arrangements order only on the application of—
(a) a person who is, for the purposes of the child arrangements order, the person with whom the child concerned lives or is to live;
(b) a person whose contact with the child concerned is provided for in the child arrangements order;
(c) any individual subject to a condition under section 11(7)(b) or an activity condition imposed by the child arrangements order; or
(d) the child concerned.”
That is all well and good.The frequent advice given to a client (usually the father) after the court has made a child arrangements order, for him to spend time with his child, when asked what will happen if the primary carer does not comply, is that there are remedies available in Section 11J of the Children Act 1989.
This article is an update of my previous article on this subject in 2020, with the most recent case on the subject demonstrating as clearly as possible, how inadequate the provisions of S11J are.
The most recent case is B v C 2026 EWFC 66.
The relevant facts are these:- An order was made by consent for the father to spend time with his daughter on 1 December 2012. The child at the time was two years of age. The order provided for the father to spend time with the child, on each Tuesday and on alternate Saturdays.
After a long period of contact lasting over nine years, the mother stopped contact.
On 4 March 2022, the father made his application to enforce the child arrangements order. The Cafcass safeguarding letter prepared for the First Hearing Dispute Resolution Appointment, (FHDRA), informed the court that there were no safeguarding concerns identified in respect of the father’s care of the child.
At the FHDRA, the court directed a section 7 report to be prepared by Cafcass and suspended the child arrangements order.
At the Dispute Resolution Appointment, on 28 June 2023, on the recommendation of the section 7 report, the court directed the parties to engage in an Improving Child and Family Arrangements course, (ICFA), after the mother consented to it, along with the father having indirect contact.
That hearing was the last hearing the mother attended, despite the court on four occasions issuing penal notices and warrants for her arrest, to help secure her attendance. On one occasion she was fined £250 for breach of the penal notice to attend court.
The ICFA did not go ahead, despite the mother agreeing to it, as she frustrated the process by refusing to travel for it to take place, although it appeared that the indirect contact had commenced.
On 30 April 2025, the child was made a party to proceedings and a rule 16.4 guardian was appointed to act on her behalf.
During the proceedings the court directed the filing of a section 37 report and later an addendum section 37 report, so much were the concerns for the child in the mother’s care.
The proceedings were eventually listed for a final hearing, and by that time there had been 13 previous hearings on the father’s application.
The father’s written evidence for the final hearing set out his efforts to have contact with the child and his reasons for wanting the same.
The Guardian’s final analysis made a recommendation for no order for contact to be made and for there to be no contact between the father and the child.
The mother’s written evidence stated that the child did not want to see the father and that she had encouraged the child to have a negative view of the father. The mother’s evidence was also abusive towards Cafcass, the father and the local authority.
The Cafcass section 7 report, records that the mother made allegations of domestic abuse against the father, despite the fact that she and the father had not been in contact with each other for nearly 10 years. There was also concern that the mother was placing responsibility on the child beyond her age and that the mother had shared information with her. The report concluded that there was not sufficient justification for there to be no contact.
The first section 37 report records the mother refusing permission for the child to be spoken to, but agreed with the recommendations of the section 7 report that there should be direct contact.
By the time the addendum section 37 report was filed, the child had been withdrawn from school in February 2025 and was being home schooled. The elective home education team confirmed that they had not seen the child during their visits and had no rights of access to the child as the mother did not allow it. As a result there was no independent information about the child’s welfare or education at the time of the report.
The report also had concerns that the child had been socially isolated, causing harm by way of a lack of meaningful relationships with her family, friends and peers. There were also concerns of possible parental alienation.
As a result a strategy discussion and an Initial Child Protection Conference were arranged, to consider whether the threshold was met for the provision of protective services. Those took place, but the conclusions were that the threshold was not met for a Child Protection Plan to be put in place and that little would be gained by a Child In Need Plan as that required the voluntary agreement from the mother to work with social services, which was not forthcoming and therefore the case was closed with no further action.
The Guardian’s final analysis, recommended that proceedings conclude without the making of any order, due to the child’s age and the total lack of engagement by the mother and the child in the process. The report also considered whether there should be a transfer of the “live with” order to the father, but concluded that it would not be in the child’s best interest.
This recommendation was in spite of the Guardian’s concern for the child’s emotional well-being in the care of the mother, the quality of education she was receiving and her immediate welfare being harmed by not having any form of communication or relationship with her father.
The Guardian mentioned in his analysis that the mother did not engaged with him despite many attempts being made to meet her, and also the child did not engage with him either. The Guardian therefore concluded sadly, that there was no way for the child to re-establish a relationship with the father within these proceedings. As a result, his recommendation was for proceedings to conclude with the making of an order for no contact.
Taking everything into account the court’s decision on balance, was that there should be no order made on the father’s application for enforcement, as nothing would be gained by the making of an order. In coming to that decision the court saw the making of no order as the “lesser of two evils,” despite the court making findings, beyond reasonable doubt, that the mother had breached the child arrangements order.
This case clearly demonstrates that while in theory there are provisions in place to enforce child arrangements orders, faced with a scenario where there is complete opposition to it happening and where there is the suspicion that the child has been alienated against the father, and even with the court being satisfied that the contact order has been breached, the court had to concede that the making of an order against the mother was not in the child’s interest.
It is submitted that the facts of this case is not entirely unique and therefore it must be time for the enforcement provisions to be reviewed, to provide them with more teeth and confidence in the system.
